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Abstract
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are
an attractive alternative for space-based remote sensing applications. However, SRAMbased FPGAs are sensitive to radiationinduced single-event upsets within the conﬁguration memory. Such conﬁguration upsets may
change the logic, routing, and operating modes
of a user FPGA design. Upsets within the
conﬁguration of an I/O block are especially
troublesome as they may impact the operation
of other system components. This paper will
evaluate the operation of the I/O block within
the Xilinx Virtex FPGA in the presence of conﬁguration memory upsets and introduce techniques for detecting and repairing such failures.
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Introduction

Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs)
are an attractive alternative for applicationspeciﬁc processing in space based applications
because of their ﬂexibility and in-system reprogrammability. Unlike application-speciﬁc
integrated circuits (ASICs), FPGAs can be
conﬁgured and reprogrammed while the spacecraft is in orbit. Multiple application-speciﬁc
circuits can be conﬁgured within the FPGA
based on changing mission needs or improvements to the algorithm. Several projects report the advantages of reconﬁgurable FPGAs
within a spacecraft [1, 2, 3].

While FPGAs oﬀer several advantages for
space-based computing, FPGAs are sensitive
to radiation eﬀects. Reconﬁgurable SRAM
based FPGAs are especially sensitive to singleevent upsets or SEUs. A single-event upset
is a change of state within a circuit caused
by a heavy ion or proton. Single-event upsets cause a temporary, non-permanent state
change within the ﬂip-ﬂops, latches, and memories of a device. While single-event upsets do
not permanently damage a device, the change
in state caused by an SEU may change the operation of the device or lead to undesired system behavior.
Single-event upsets are especially troublesome when they occur in the conﬁguration
memory of the FPGA. The conﬁguration memory of an FPGA deﬁnes the routing, logic function, and operating modes of the circuit conﬁgured onto the device. Upsets in the conﬁguration memory may change the circuit operating on the device. Such conﬁguration SEUs
may disconnect circuit routing, change internal
logic equations, or modify the operating modes
of memories and other FPGA resources. To operate properly in space, FPGA-based systems
must anticipate and mitigate against conﬁguration memory SEUs.
While all FPGA resources are sensitive to
conﬁguration SEUs, it is especially important
to insure that the programmable input/output
blocks (IOBs) operate correctly in the presence of conﬁguration SEUs. A potentially

dangerous situation can result if a conﬁguration memory upset changes the function a programmable IOB. For example, modiﬁcations
in the conﬁguration memory of an IOB may
change the programmable IOB pin from an input to an output. The creation of an unintended output IOB may cause unanticipated
contention on a system bus, excessive power
consumption, and incorrect system operation.
This paper investigates the behavior of programmable IOBs in the presence of conﬁguration memory upsets. Speciﬁcally, this paper
will study the behavior of IOBs found within
the Xilinx Virtex FPGA. To study the IOB
behavior, a simulation environment was created to artiﬁcially corrupt the IOB conﬁguration memory. The paper will begin by reviewing related work and introducing the SEU
simulator. Next, the methodology for testing
programmable IOBs will be described along
with test results. After presenting the results,
techniques for detecting faults within the programmable IOBs will be suggested.
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duce incorrect results or unspeciﬁed behavior.
Because of the high-density of conﬁguration
memory, SEUs are especially troublesome for
SRAM-based FPGAs. The internal conﬁguration memory of the Virtex V1000 FPGA device requires almost 6 million bits to describe
the interconnect, logic, I/O pins, and operating
modes of a user design [7].
Several techniques have been proposed and
tested for mitigating SEUs in FPGAs. Several
techniques use hardware redundancy to reduce
the probability of failure [8]. By replicating
the desired circuitry and comparing the results,
faults in the conﬁguration can be detected and
reported. Other techniques rely on device reconﬁguration to continually “clean” the conﬁguration bitstream[9]. By repeatedly conﬁguring the device, SEUs occurring within the conﬁguration bitstream are replaced by the correct
value.

3

Xilinx Virtex IOB Architecture

Eﬀects of SEUs in FPGAs

With increased interest in exploiting programmable logic in space related applications,
researchers have investigated the suitability
of commercially available FPGAs in radiation
environments[1]. Interest in the Xilinx Virtex FPGA architecture has motivated the testing of the high-reliability XQVR Virtex device
for radiation tolerance [4]. Based on a thinepitaxial 0.22 µmm CMOS process, this device
tolerates a total dose in the range of 80 to 100
krads(Si). This total dose tolerance is acceptable for many low-earth orbit applications[5].
Further, there is no risk of latch-up occurring
in orbit.
While the XQVR Virtex FPGA is immune
to latch-up and has an acceptable total-dose
tolerance, it is sensitive to heavy ion and proton induced SEUs[6]. A single-event upset may
alter the state of the FPGA ﬂip-ﬂops or conﬁguration memory causing the device to pro-

It is especially important to consider how an
upset in the conﬁguration memory can alter
the operation of the input/output pins of an
FPGA. Since FPGA pins are attached to other
devices within a system, a change in the IOB
behavior may have a large impact on the electronic system. For example, an IOB pin conﬁgured as an input may be changed into an
output pin through unintentional conﬁguration
memory SEUs. The creation of such unintentional output pins may produce contention on
a system bus and generate excessive current
within the FPGA.
The Xilinx Virtex IOB is complex and supports many modes of operation and customization options. Figure 1 shows a simpliﬁed model
of the IOB architecture. Each IOB can be
conﬁgured as an input, an output, or as a bidirectional tri-state signal. When the IOB is
conﬁgured as an input, a de-asserted tri-state
enable signal disables the tri-state buﬀer (see

Figure 2). When the IOB is conﬁgured as an
output, the tri-state signal is asserted low to
enable the tri-state buﬀer. In addition, each
IOB includes three ﬂip-ﬂops to provide registering capability at the input, output, and tristate enable.
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polarity is inverted. Also, a change in the slew
rate or clock polarity can cause timing errors.
Upsetting the IOB bitstream can have more severe consequences if changes could cause contention on the system bus. This can happen
if the tri-state buﬀer of an input IOB is enabled. In this scenario, an input IOB becomes
corrupted and acts as an output IOB.
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Figure 2: Simpliﬁed Input IOB

Figure 1: Simpliﬁed Programmable I/O Block
For clarity, many IOB circuit elements have
been left out of Figure 1, however, there are
many diﬀerent additional elements included in
each Virtex IOB. For instance, the IOB’s I/O
standard can be changed from LVTTL (the default I/O standard) to one of 15 other standards. Another programmable IOB element is
the output signal drive strength. This drive
strength can range from 2mA to 24mA. Also
included in the complexity of each IOB is an
optional termination (pullup resistor, pulldown
resistor or keeper), an optional input delay and
a variable slew rate.
In the Xilinx Virtex XCV1000 device there
are approximately 324 bits in the FPGA conﬁguration bitstream which correspond to each
IOB circuit element. Upsetting any of these
324 bits can have adverse eﬀects on the behaviour of the IOB[1]. Upsets in the IOB bitstream can aﬀect the IOB conﬁguration modes,
I/O logic values, or any of the architectural elements and attributes of the IOB. For example,
output logic errors can be caused if the output

It is important to note that many of the
IOB architectural attributes correspond to a
single bit in the conﬁguration bitstream. Thus
an SEU in the IOB section of the conﬁguration memory can very easily aﬀect how an IOB
functions. For example, if the bit(s) reserved
for the tri-state multiplexer (TRIMUX) select
line are corrupted and the signal is inverted,
the operation of the tri-state buﬀer will change.
This could potentially cause bus contention.
To illustrate, consider Figure 2 which shows an
IOB functioning as an input. Figure 3 shows
how IOB conﬁguration upsets can activate the
tri-state buﬀer causing the output signal to be
driven onto the bus, in contention with the incoming input signal.

4

IOB Corruption Tests

The primary purpose of this work is to determine the robustness of programmable IOBs in
the presence of upsets within the conﬁguration
memory. To test the reliability of the Xilinx

T

ured onto PE1 and will be subject to a series
of artiﬁcial conﬁguration memory upsets. As
conﬁguration upsets are inserted into these two
input IOBs, the behavior of the these IOBs will
change.
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Figure 3: Corrupted input IOB
Virtex IOB architecture, upsets will be artiﬁcially inserted in the appropriate IOB conﬁguration memory bits. As the IOB conﬁguration
memory is corrupted, the operation of the IOB
is carefully monitored to detect changes in the
IOB behavior. Speciﬁcally, these tests will determine how many conﬁguration bit upsets are
required to reconﬁgure an input IOB (i.e. Figure 2) into an output IOB as shown in Figure
3.
This IOB testing methodology will use a
simulator developed speciﬁcally for testing upsets within the FPGA conﬁguration memory
[10]. Based on the SLAAC-1V FPGA computing board[11], this test-bed provides the capability of rapidly inserting or removing upsets
within the conﬁguration memory of a target
FPGA. The SLAAC-1V board contains two
Xilinx Virtex V1000 FPGAs for testing purposes (PE1 and PE2) and one FPGA (PE0) for
observing the FPGAs under test and providing
appropriate circuit stimulus. This simulation
platform also provides the ability to control
and query the operation of the FPGAs from
a host-based computer.
The primary goal of this test is to determine
how many conﬁguration bit upsets are required
to change an input IOB into an output IOB.
To perform this test, a simple FPGA design
is created that contains only two input IOBs
as shown in Figure 4. This design is conﬁg-

PE1

PE2

Figure 4: Programmable I/O Test Architecture
To detect changes in the operation of the
IOBs within PE1, a second FPGA design is
created in PE2. As shown in Figure 4, this
design contains two input IOBs that are connected to the two input IOBs of PE1 through
traces on the board. These input pads monitor
the signal values of PE1 and are able to detect
changes in the input/output behavior of the
IOBs under test. These two signals are also
readable by the host computer. This allows
the host to detect changes in the input/output
behavior of the design under test.
Under normal circumstances, no active circuit is driving the signal trace connecting the
input pads in PE1 and PE2. To force a default value on each of these wires, internal resistors are added. A pull-up resistor (≈ 13kΩ)
is added to the ﬁrst wire forcing a logic ‘1’ and
a pull-down resistor (≈ 22kΩ) is added to the
second wire forcing a logic ‘0’. When the IOBs
in PE1 are operating correctly, the host will
read a logic ‘1’ for the ﬁrst pair of I/O blocks
and a logic ‘0’ for the second pair of I/O blocks.
The test structure of Figure 4 is organized
to detect changes in the input IOB conﬁguration of PE1. Speciﬁcally, this test detects when
conﬁguration upsets change the IOB from an

input into an output. If the input IOBs in PE1
are changed from an input to an active output,
the output IOB will overcome the pull-up or
pull-down and drive a new value on the signal
input to PE2. This change in signal level is
detected by the host and recorded.
Two signal levels are used in this test structure to identify both the stuck-at-0 and stuckat-1 cases. If the IOB is changed to an output driving a logic ‘1’ (i.e. stuck-at-1), it will
only be detected by the input pad with the
pull-down. Since the default value of the pulldown signal is ‘0’, a stuck-at-1 output driver
will overcome the pull-down and drive a logic
‘1’. This change in value is detected by the
host. However, this fault will not be detected
by the input pad with the pull-up resistor. A
stuck-at-1 output driver will continue to drive
a logic ‘1’ on the pull-up signal with no change
in value. By using two default signal levels,
both output driver faults can be detected.

5

IOB Test Results

With the FPGAs conﬁgured as shown in Figure 4, conﬁguration bits associated with PE1
are modiﬁed in an attempt to convert the input
IOBs into output IOBs. Two series of tests are
performed on the IOBs. In the ﬁrst series of
tests, each of the 324 conﬁguration bits associated with the two IOBs are individually toggled. The purpose of this test is to determine
if any single-bit upset within the conﬁguration
bitstream will change the input IOB structure
into an output IOB structure. In the second
series of tests, all two-bit combinations of the
324 conﬁguration bits are toggled. This test
will determine how many two-bit conﬁguration
upsets change the input IOB into an output.
While additional tests could be performed to
investigate triple and quadruple conﬁguration
bit upsets, this work is limited to the study of
single and double upsets within the conﬁguration bitstream.

5.1

Single-Bit Results

In the ﬁrst series of tests, all single bit upsets
in the conﬁguration bitstream are made for the
two IOBs under test in PE1. For each test, a
single bit in the bitstream is toggled and conﬁgured onto the FPGA. Once the modiﬁed design is operating within PE1, the values of the
two test signals are queried by the host. After
recording the result of the test, the corresponding bit within in the bitstream is repaired and
the FPGA is conﬁgured with the original design. This process is repeated until all 324 bits
associated with each of the two IOBs have been
tested.
After performing this test for each of the 324
conﬁguration bits, only one bit changed the default values of the two test signals. When this
particular conﬁguration bit was set, a logic ‘1’
was read from the default logic ‘0’ case. This
conﬁguration bit changed in the input IOB of
PE1 in a way that overcomes the pull-down
in PE2. Upon further investigation, it is determined that this particular conﬁguration bit
enables the pull-up resistor within the IOB of
PE1 as shown in Figure 5. Since the pull-up is
slightly stronger than the pull-down (i.e. 13kΩ
vs. 22kΩ), a logic ‘1’ is read in PE2.

Stuck-at 0

1
Stuck-at 1

1

PE1

PE2

Figure 5: Single-Bit SEU Activating a Pull-Up
Resistor.
While this particular fault within the IOB
does cause a logic error and possibly an incorrect voltage level, it does not create a situation resulting in excessive IOB current. The

current is limited below .1 mA by the series
resistance of the relatively weak pull-up and
pull-down IOB resistors. This particular fault
will not cause damage or excessive current to
either the FPGA or other non-FPGA components connected to this pin.
It is interesting to note that no single-bit
conﬁguration upset changes the value of the
default logic ‘1’ circuit. While it is likely that a
bit within the conﬁguration bitstream enables
the pull-down resistor within the IOB, the pulldown resistor is weaker than the pull-up and
the fault is not detected. Again, this situation
results in minimal current and will not damage
the device or external circuitry.

5.2

Two-Bit Results

In the second series of tests, all two-bit pairs
of the IOB conﬁguration bitstream are modiﬁed and programmed onto the test circuit of
Figure 4. For each of these tests, two conﬁguration bits are toggled and the bitstream is
conﬁgured onto the device. Once the circuit is
operational, the values of the default test signals are read by the host and recorded. This
process is repeated until all 324×323 or 104,652
pairs associated with each of the two IOBs have
been tested.
As expected, corrupting two bits within the
IOB conﬁguration bitstream identiﬁed more
IOB faults than the single-bit test. Most of
these observed faults occurred when the pullup associated with the default Logic ‘0’ test
signal was enabled (see Figure 5). Since this
particular fault was already identiﬁed in the
single-bit case, double-bit variations of this
fault are ignored.
The two-bit conﬁguration upset tests identiﬁed a fault in the IOB that was not seen in the
single-bit test. In this instance, the input IOB
in PE1 associated with the default ‘1’ signal
was changed to an output IOB actively driving
a logic ‘0’ on the test wire. As shown in Figure 6, this active driver overcomes the passive
pull-up resistor to force a ‘0’ on the signal wire.

Stuck-at 0

0
Stuck-at 1

0
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Figure 6: Double-Bit SEU Activating an Output Logic ‘0’ Driver.
The unintended active output driver shown
in Figure 6 occurs for two pairs of conﬁguration
upsets. It is interesting to note that one of the
modiﬁed IOB conﬁguration bits is common to
both cases. While the actual purpose of these
conﬁguration bits is not published, it is likely
that these bits aﬀect the TRIMUX select line
in Figure 1 and set the drive strength of the
output driver.
Based on these results, it is clear that the
IOB is not immune to two-bit upsets within
the conﬁguration memory. Two of the 104,652
pairs of double-bit upsets will cause the IOB
to change from an input to an active output
driver. If conﬁguration memory upsets are
distributed uniformly over the entire conﬁguration bitstream, the probability of upsetting
these two speciﬁc conﬁguration bits is very low.
With 5,962,944 bits within the complete Xilinx
Virtex V1000 FPGA, the probability that two
conﬁguration upsets will cause this IOB failure
within one of the 512 IOBs is 2.9 × 10−11 .
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Detection of IOB Conﬁguration Upsets

Although the probability is low that a twobit conﬁguration upset will cause the creation
of an unintended output, it is important that
such a condition is detected by a radiation
tolerant system. If such unintended outputs

are not detected and corrected, the electronic
system may suﬀer incorrect system operation,
premature damage, and excessive power consumption. Once a fault within the IOB has
been detected, the FPGA conﬁguration memory must be repaired through device reconﬁguration. Two techniques for detecting upsets
within the IOB conﬁguration will be presented.

6.1

Redundant I/O Pins

The ﬁrst technique for detecting conﬁguration
upsets within the IOB is the use of redundant I/O pins. The circuit shown in Figure
7 demonstrates how two FPGA pins can be
used to detect changes in the behavior of the
IOBs. In this circuit, a signal is driven by an
external device and connected to two independent FPGA input pads through two separate
current-limiting resistors.
Within the FPGA, these two internal signals
are constantly compared using available logic
resources. When functioning normally, the two
input pads will read the same value from the
two external resistors. The XOR comparator is
used to compare the two internal signals – as
long as the two input signals are the same, the
XOR produces a logic ‘0’. The output of the XOR
is registered by the system clock to avoid false
errors caused by timing diﬀerences between the
two input signals. A logic ‘0’ within this register indicates correct operation of the I/O pads.

System Device

FPGA
R
IPAD
error

change in the IOB conﬁguration. If the conﬁguration of one of these input IOBs is changed
into an active output pad, the output pad will
drive an active signal on the FPGA-side of the
resistor. If the external device and the FPGA
pin are driving diﬀerent logic values, current
will ﬂow through the resistor and an incorrect
logic level will be driven by the FPGA output
pad. This incorrect value will be read by the
pad input and the internal comparator circuit
will detect a diﬀerence between the corrupted
IOB and the uncorrupted IOB. Once the error
has been registered and detected, the host will
completely reconﬁgure the device to repair the
conﬁguration memory upsets.
The primary advantage of this technique is
the speed at which the IOB fault is detected.
This circuit will detected the IOB fault as soon
as the comparator circuit detects diﬀerences in
the two input signal values. Rapid detection of
the fault will prevent excessive power loss and
limit the damage caused by the contention. An
additional advantage of this approach is the
current limitations placed on the unintended
FPGA output. If an FPGA output pad contends with a pin from an external device, the
current during contention is limited by the series resistor.
The primary disadvantage of this technique
is the added hardware cost. To implement
this technique, two FPGA pins are required
for each FPGA input signal. Many FPGA
designs are limited by the available I/O resources and cannot tolerate redundant I/O signals. Other disadvantages of this approach
include increased signal transition time and
static power consumption caused by the series
signal resistors.

R

6.2

Figure 7: Redundant Input Pads
The circuit is designed to detect logic diﬀerences between the two I/O pins caused by a

Conﬁguration Readback

Another technique for detecting upsets within
the IOB conﬁguration memory is the use of
conﬁguration readback. The Xilinx Virtex
family of FPGAs supports the ability to read
the current contents of the conﬁguration memory through a process call “readback”. This

capability allows the user of the FPGA to determine if the correct conﬁguration bitstream
was loaded into the FPGA. Readback has also
been used to detect radiation-induced upsets
within the conﬁguration memory [9].
To detect random upsets within the conﬁguration memory of the FPGA, the contents of
the conﬁguration memory must be constantly
read through the readback process. As the bitstreams are read from the device, they must be
compared with known “safe” conﬁguration bitstreams. If the bitstream read from the device
diﬀers from the known “safe” bitstream, an upset within the conﬁguration is detected and the
device can be reconﬁgured.
One disadvantage of this approach is the relatively long time required to detect and identify conﬁguration upsets. The detection process must read each frame of the bitstream,
compute a cyclic-redundancy code (CRC), and
compare it with a known CRC code-book. This
process can take several hundred milliseconds
for the entire device.
An important advantage of this technique
is that readback will detect upsets within the
entire conﬁguration memory, not just the input/output blocks. Constant readback and
veriﬁcation of the bitstream can be employed
for SEU detection for the entire FPGA and
avoid the need to implement architectural
speciﬁc SEU detection. Conﬁguration faults
within the interconnect, logic, ﬂip-ﬂops, clock
buﬀers and other global FPGA resources can
all be detected using the same readbackcompare methodology.

7

Conclusion

The test methodology described in this paper
has been used to determine the behavior of programmable input/output blocks in the presence of conﬁguration memory upsets. Speciﬁcally, this test procedure was used to determine
that at least two bits within the conﬁguration
memory must be upset before an input pin is

changed into an active output pin. In this case,
the unintentional active output drives a constant ‘0’ signal (stuck at 0) and will likely cause
contention on a system bus.
Two techniques were presented for detecting
such faults within the IOB conﬁguration. Redundant I/O pins and conﬁguration readback
can be used to identify faulty IOBs and signal a need for device reconﬁguration. Once a
fault has been found within an IOB, the faulty
IOB must be repaired by reloading the conﬁguration and reseting the device. Rapid repair of such faults is necessary to minimize the
power consumption, premature device failure,
and improper system operation caused by a
faulty IOB.
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